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 1. Introduction 
Recent developments in European security have shown the growing 
need for a better understanding of the dynamics that may both threaten 
and ensure security and stability on the European continent. This paper 
presents an analysis of differing Russian and European perceptions of 
European security in general, and more specifically concerning the 
crisis in Ukraine. As much of the literature on these issues has been 
normatively driven, we aim to provide an objective presentation and 
analysis of the dominant Russian and EU discourses. This we see as 
essential for investigating the potential for constructive dialogue be-
tween Russia and the EU.1  
Making a serious effort to understand the other side’s point of view 
does not mean justifying or accepting that position. However, it is cru-
cial to recognize that different actors have different reference frames, 
and that this in turn may lead them to perceive events very differently. 
As the US scholar Robert Jervis observed nearly 40 years ago, misper-
ceptions of others' perceptions are a continuous source of conflicts in 
the international arena. He stressed the importance of trying ‘to see the 
world the way the other sees it’ in order to ‘avoid the common error of 
assuming that the way he sees the world is the only possible one’ and 
‘also to avoid the trap of believing that the other sees his actions as he 
sees them’ (Jervis 1976: 409–410). 
With the Ukraine crisis, the relevance of the Kremlin's perspective is 
often dismissed. Certainly, a key aspect of the crisis is that Russian ac-
tions are undermining the European security system that has evolved 
over the last 25 years. Yet this in itself cannot be a reason for not seek-
ing a better understanding of Russian readings of the situation – quite 
the contrary. The same applies to Russia’s increasing authoritarianism 
and endemic corruption (see Dawisha 2014), and also the Kremlin’s 
propaganda campaigns, which Pomerantsev and Weiss (2014) have 
dubbed the ‘weaponization of information’. In short: All these factors 
may effectively discredit the Russian regime – but they do not lessen 
the importance of understanding Russian perspectives on European 
security.  
The crucial issue is the interaction between differing perceptions, so 
both sides must be studied. As Jervis noted, people not only fail to un-
derstand other points of view – too often, they also lack sufficient un-
                                                          
1  The analysis is informed by a series of interviews conducted in Brussels and Mos-
cow in May 2015. In addition, we have consulted official documents and state-
ments as well as secondary literature by Russian and Western scholars. 
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derstanding of ‘the structure of their own belief systems’: ‘[p]articularly 
dangerous is the tendency to take the most important questions for 
granted’ (Jervis 1976: 410). That is also the essence of Robert Legvold's 
observation that the Ukraine crisis is a clear example of a conflict 
where perceptions and misperceptions of the other side's perspectives 
are of central significance: ‘Each side sees the conflict as a result solely 
of the actions – or even the nature – of the other. Neither pays attention 
to the complicated interactions that brought relations to their present 
low’ (Legvold 2014: 74). Similar concerns have been raised by other 
commentators (see e.g. Kissinger 2014; Pravda 2014; Charap & 
Shapiro 2014). Also firm supporters of EU policy tacitly admit that the 
EU has not sufficiently understood Russia. For instance, some EU offi-
cials who otherwise hold EU policy to have been correct have admitted 
that they underestimated Russian reactions to those policies.2 Angela 
Merkel's comment that Putin lives in ‘another world’ (New York Times 
2014) is often interpreted as purely derogatory, but could instead be 
taken as a call to study Russian perceptions more deeply.  
By not seriously engaging with both EU and Russian perceptions, we 
risk having a poorer basis for policy development – narrowing possible 
paths, while aggravating Russian dissatisfaction. If simplistic assump-
tions about the motivations and intentions of other actors take hold in 
the public debate and policy analyses, the main actors may be drawn 
into a logic that is ultimately dangerous or counter-productive. With 
this paper we offer a modest contribution towards discouraging such a 
development in Russia–EU relations. We begin by presenting an analy-
sis of the different approaches and differing perceptions of European 
security and the Ukraine crisis. We then discuss the potential for dia-
logue and diplomatic solutions between such different worldviews, 
before concluding with reflections on potential implications for Euro-
pean security. 
  
  
                                                          
2  Interviews, Brussels, May 2015. 
 2. Colliding perceptions of  
European security 
Informed discussion of possible ways of ensuring European security 
requires a clear understanding of the underpinnings of Russian as well 
as EU security thinking. In his recent book about the Ukraine crisis, 
Richard Sakwa (2015: 26) argues that two opposing visions of Europe 
have collided. First, the idea of a ‘“Wider Europe” with the EU at its 
heart but increasingly coterminous with the Euro-Atlantic security and 
political community’. Second, the idea of a 'Greater Europe', with ‘a 
vision of a continental Europe, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, 
that has multiple centres, including Brussels, Moscow and Ankara, but 
with a common purpose in overcoming the divisions that have tradi-
tionally plagued the continent.’ These two visions build on very differ-
ent worldviews and assumptions about the functioning of international 
politics, which in turn leads to different perspectives on European se-
curity. Clarification is crucial to understanding what happens when 
these two opposing ideas collide, as they have done and still do with 
the Ukraine crisis. 
2.1 The EU and its security community building process  
The main ideas behind the European integration process and the con-
viction that economic integration and security are closely linked fit well 
with Sakwa’s ‘Wider Europe’ perspective. In fact, these ideas have been 
at the core of the integration process that was first initiated in Western 
Europe after the end of the Second World War. At that time, economic 
integration was seen as crucial for ensuring peace on the European 
continent. This peace project has gradually expanded since the end of 
the Cold War, when the process of including Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries as well as former Soviet republics was initiated. While 
the former joined the EU in 2004, the latter were offered a kind of loos-
er association through the framework of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) in 2004 and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. The 
initial intention was also to find a way of including Russia in this pro-
cess. 
More recently, the concept of security community or security com-
munity building has been used to describe these processes (Rieker, 
forthcoming). When the concept of ‘security community’ was first de-
veloped by Karl Deutsch (1957), it was seen as a form of international 
cooperation that, under certain circumstances, also could lead to inte-
gration. Deutsch himself used the term primarily to describe the devel-
opment of a transatlantic security community. He argued that a ‘securi-
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ty community’ was formed by participating actors when their people, 
and their political elites in particular, shared stable expectations of 
peace in the present and for the future. Later, Adler and Barnett (1998) 
investigated the development of such communities in various regions 
and historical periods. In his contribution to that edited volume, Ole 
Wæver maintained that Western Europe had developed into a mature 
security community, through processes of ‘desecuritization’ (Wæver 
1998). There and in later work, Wæver has said surprisingly little about 
the potential of the EU as an institution for building security communi-
ties beyond its borders. In Regions and Powers (Buzan and Wæver 
2004), however, he argues, together with Barry Buzan, that Europe 
must be understood as a Regional Security Complex with the integra-
tion process at its core. The argument is that security is ensured by the 
fear of a return to a situation dominated by balance of power.  
This perspective can offer useful insights for understanding the EU’s 
policy towards Ukraine. After all, this policy (as well as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership) has been devel-
oped largely on the template of the enlargement process, and the EU’s 
aim has been to expand its security community through comprehensive 
association agreements (Rieker, forthcoming). Ideas of security com-
munity building have also been praised in the West: the EU was even 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for this endeavour in 2012. However, it 
remains to be seen what will happen to these ideas when they are chal-
lenged by colliding Russian ideas about European security. 
2.2 Russia and multipolarity 
In contrast to the EU-centred security community perspective, Russia 
has promoted a multipolar vision of European security, with ‘more than 
one centre and without a single ideological flavour’. This is what Sakwa 
calls the 'Greater Europe' perspective – as opposed to an EU- or NATO-
dominated type of cooperation (Sakwa 2015: 27). The main principle is 
that real security must be shared by all; keywords here are ‘indivisible 
security’ and ‘equal cooperation’ (Foreign Policy Concept 2013).  
While the EU approach is best understood as a liberal institutionalist 
(or soft constructivist) approach, Russia’s perspective appears to be in 
line with classical realism and traditional power politics. The Kremlin 
promotes the idea of a multipolar system – which classical realists have 
held up as one of the most stable systems or power constellations (Carr 
1939; Morgenthau 1973). Critics, however, argue that such a system 
might very well be inclusive, but inclusive only for the major powers, 
including Russia; and that this could be seen as a call for a new type of 
‘concert of great powers’3 (Lo 2015: 180). 
                                                          
3  The 'Concert of Europe’ is commonly used to describe the period from after the 
Napoleonic Wars to the Crimean War, which was an example of peaceful multipolar-
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Like the EU, Russia has been quite consistent as to the basic premis-
es of its perspective on European security and the need for an inclusive 
European security architecture. For example, in a statement in 2000 
and repeatedly echoed since then, Putin envisioned that Europe should 
be ‘a single space of democracy, prosperity and equal security for all its 
states […] in line with the multilateral agreements under the OSCE, in-
cluding the European Security Charter’. He also emphasized the need to 
move beyond the confrontational postures that had characterized the 
Cold War period, and underlined that Russia was worried about certain 
tendencies in Europe: 
We are keeping a close eye on the evolution of the European Union, the OSCE, 
NATO, the Council of Europe and regional organisations […]. For instance, we can-
not but be worried about the attempts to put NATO at the centre of the emerging Eu-
ropean security system. That objectively weakens the role of the OSCE, which has 
the greatest potential for balancing the interests of all European countries (Putin 
2000). 
The backdrop was – and still is – that, whereas the West views the 
eastward expansion of the EU and NATO after the end of the Cold War 
as a great success for stability and democracy in Europe, Russia per-
ceives this as a fundamental mistake that has squandered the unique 
opportunity to build a truly inclusive security order. In contrast to the 
dominant Western European narrative, the end of the Cold War is often 
seen as a shared victory in Russia, with Gorbachev's willingness to 
search for a ‘common European home’ as the decisive factor. Russia 
believes that, by disregarding this idea of a ‘Greater Europe’, the EU (or 
the West more broadly) is creating new division lines in Europe. For the 
Kremlin, the ‘Wider Europe’ expansion is seen as building a bulwark 
against Russia. Thus, the Ukraine crisis is perceived as a direct result of 
this Western policy – in much the same way as many in the West see 
the crisis as confirming the correctness of expanding Western security 
instruments eastwards. 
2.3  Security community building and multipolarity as in-
compatible logics?  
The well-known Russian scholar Sergei Medvedev has summarized the 
fundamental difference between the European security community 
perspective and the Russian realist approach as follows: 
‘Sovereignty’ and ‘Europeanization’ are two competing bureaucratic strategies of 
managing globalization, one aimed at protecting internal order, and another aimed 
at projecting internal order. Russia is reinforcing domestic stateness as a conserva-
tive means of minimizing the ambiguity of global challenges while the EU projects 
                                                          
ity (the great powers of Europe assembled regularly to discuss international and 
domestic issues). 
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its domestic structures as a means to manage ambiguity along its periphery 
(Medvedev 2008: 225). 
While Putin’s first period was interpreted in the EU as showing willing-
ness to accept the ‘Wider Europe’ perspective, it soon became clear that 
this was not the case. In Sergei Karaganov’s (2005) words, in the early 
2000s ‘Europe and Russia drew closer together again only to realize 
how different they were.’ And yet, this mutual recognition of differ-
ences has not been accompanied by an understanding of how these 
differences could be managed. While the situation has often been de-
scribed as a ‘competition between a benign, normative power Europe, 
on the one hand, and a malign Russian “sphere of influence” on the 
other, it is also possible to underscore how EU’s approach in reality left 
very ‘little room for enhanced dialogue’ with Russia (Averre 2009: 
1708) – to the dismay of Moscow. Fyodor Lukyanov, for example, con-
cisely summarized a view widespread in Moscow: 
Western politicians constantly repeat that it is necessary to give up zero-sum think-
ing and look for win–win models. But at the same time, the European Union is con-
vinced in the historical superiority of its political model… In other words, in the 
West there is an a priori conviction that what is good for Europe and the US is good 
for everyone else, because the Western model is the correct one (Lukyanov 2008: 
1114). 
In 2014 Karaganov also laconically noted that the West ‘never missed 
the chance to expand its own ostensibly non-existent sphere of influ-
ence’ (Karaganov 2014). 
As the EU continued its project of building a security community, 
bringing it closer to Russia’s borders, and Russia started its own Eura-
sian integration project, geopolitics did emerge at the centre of EU–
Russia relations – although it took some time for the EU to realize that. 
In many ways, the security community building project (operational-
ized through the EaP) began to compete directly with Russia's own 
Eurasian integration project (Sakwa 2015: 35). The EU approach has 
been to insist on the importance of the Eastern Partnership Countries 
having a free choice, and the need for the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU) to respect the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(Council of the EU 2015). Inspired by John Herz’s realist idea about the 
security dilemma (Herz 1950), Samuel Charap and Mikhail Troitskiy 
(2013) have accurately described this situation as ‘the integration di-
lemma’. As they explain, such a dilemma ‘can be said to occur when 
one state perceives as a threat to its own security or prosperity its 
neighbours’ integration into military alliances or economic groupings 
that are closed to it’ (Charap and Troitskiy 2013: 50). They go on to 
argue that the ‘history of post-Cold War European institutional en-
largement is fraught with integration dilemmas’, starting with NATO 
enlargement (2013: 51). An important element here is that the EU’s 
foreign policy has increasingly been perceived in Moscow as linked to 
Pernille Rieker and Kristian Lundby Gjerde 
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NATO, also referred to by Russian scholars as the 'NATO-ization' of the 
European security system (Arbatova 2014: 12). This has been a key 
theme in the Kremlin’s developing attitude to the EU.4 Added to this 
comes the perception as the EU as internally divided and with decreas-
ing influence in an increasingly multipolar world. 
Russia's view can be seen as opposition to unipolarity on several 
levels. Most obviously, Moscow objects to a security arrangement with 
one centre (Brussels/Washington). Second, it has increasingly objected 
to the EU's claim to ‘normative hegemony in Europe’ (Haukkala 2015: 
36). And finally, it does not accept being part of Europe's ‘neighbour-
hood’. Where the West sees progressive and mutually beneficial expan-
sion of stability and democracy, Russia sees hypocrisy, double stand-
ards and Western blindness to the viewpoints of others – and outright 
hostility towards Russia.  
Subtle differences have permeated Russian–EU misreadings. For in-
stance, one week before Yanukovich fled Kyiv in February 2014, Rus-
sian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov published an article in Kommer-
sant, criticizing the EU’s approach as ‘contrary to the logic of the ac-
tions aimed at erasing dividing lines in Europe, as formalized in OSCE 
documents; it looks like another round of attempts to move these lines 
to the East’ (Lavrov 2014a). Five days later a response from the EU’s 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Lady Ashton, was published in 
the same newspaper. Lavrov’s response to her provides a telling illus-
tration of how Russia and the EU may use similar words but do not real-
ly speak the same language:  
… Catherine Ashton writes that she welcomes my statement that the process of Eur-
asian integration is aimed at harmonisation with the integration processes of the 
European Union. I did not say that. I said that Russia, members of the Customs Un-
ion and the EU should be interested in the mutual harmonisation of integration 
processes. According to Catherine Ashton, things are different: Eurasian integration 
should harmonise with the integration processes of the European Union first and 
foremost. There is a difference. I hope that you understand what I mean by that. We 
are in favour of an equal approach, but the EU still proceeds from European Union 
logic (Lavrov 2014b, italics added). 
EU–Russia relations have reached a high level of tension recently, but 
this has not always been the case. Before studying the different read-
ings of the crisis in Ukraine more closely, we will briefly examine the 
main phases in the relationship since the early 1990s. 
2.4 Colliding ideas through different phases  (1992–2015) 
Russia and the EU pursue policies that are based on opposing ideas 
about how international politics function and should function. Still, it 
                                                          
4  Interviews, Moscow, May 2015. 
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is possible to identify different phases in the relationship where these 
opposing ideas have been more pronounced, or less so. Over the period 
1992–2015, both the EU and Russia have undergone substantial trans-
formations (e.g. the expansion of the EU, and Russia's economic rise 
and increasing authoritarianism). Perceptions of such developments 
have played a significant role in EU–Russian interaction. 
In distinguishing between the periods, we draw on the work of Hiski 
Haukkala (2015), who argues that the development of EU–Russia rela-
tions after the Cold War can be divided into three phases. The first was 
a formative phase in the aftermath of the Cold War, characterized by 
relative optimism and ambitions of setting up cooperative structures of 
some kind. The next phase, 1994–2000, was characterized by a more 
difficult relationship; and finally there are the different Putin eras from 
2000 onwards. In this section we follow Haukkala’s divisions, with one 
minor adjustment: we operate with three different Putin eras – alt-
hough not strictly delineated in time The first was an optimistic period 
with prospects for developing a genuine partnership with the EU (and 
the West as such); the second was characterized by growing mutual 
disappointment; and the third, still ongoing, is characterized by a more 
explicit confrontational relationship. By comparing the EU’s and Rus-
sia’s perceptions of the developing relationship through these phases, 
we hope to shed light on the dynamics that have preceded the current 
situation. 
1992–1993: optimism and setting up of cooperative structures 
For the newly established European Union in 1992, one of the most 
urgent challenges was to define an agenda of political rapprochement 
and economic integration that could ensure an orderly transition to a 
post-Soviet era. As the 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) 
with the Soviet Union was no longer valid, a process of negotiating a 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was launched at the 
initiative of the EC and continued with the EU. The PCA signed in 1994 
had a more ambitious agenda for convergence than the earlier TCA, 
which was more limited to trade cooperation. It even included obliga-
tions and mechanisms of political conditionality (Hillion 2009). In this 
period the EU seriously believed that a process towards a Europeaniza-
tion of Russia had been launched. Likewise, in the first years after the 
break-up of the USSR, Russia’s foreign policy was inspired by liberal 
ideas and Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’, and aimed at integration with 
the West (Thorun 2009: 8). 
1994–2000: time of troubles and high hopes 
The mood of optimism following the signing of the PCA did not last for 
long. Instead of swift PCA ratification and implementation, EU–Russia 
relations were hit by various crises. 
From as early as 1993, Russian foreign policy gradually shifted 
away from the previous idealism. In this period, Moscow increasingly 
Pernille Rieker and Kristian Lundby Gjerde 
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‘conceived of the international system as competitive, states were 
thought to strive for spheres of influence, and Russian foreign policy 
was tasked with establishing Russia as an equal partner vis-a-vis the 
Western states and as a Eurasian great power’ (Thorun 2009: 9).  This 
thinking led Moscow to perceive ‘NATO enlargement as a zero-sum 
game directed against Russia’ (ibid.). 
The EU also reacted to Russian domestic developments. The Russian 
handling of Chechnya led to a rupture in the ratification process of the 
PCA, put on hold by the EU until the hostilities ended in 1996. Alt-
hough the PCA entered into force in 1997, new problems in the rela-
tionship arose – first with the war in Kosovo, and then when a new 
round of fighting in Chechnya started. These crisis or setbacks in the 
relationship led the EU to re-examine the nature of its relationship to 
Russia. A new type of cooperation initiative was launched, which re-
sulted in the development of a Common Strategy on Russia in 1999. 
While Russia interpreted this as increased EU willingness to adopt a 
cooperative approach, the EU’s ambition, however, was to develop ties 
that would bind Russia closer to Europe’s model of development. De-
spite the setbacks, the long-term objective of the eventual Europeaniza-
tion of Russia was still very much alive in the EU. 
While Haukkala is correct in referring to this period (1994–2000) as 
‘the time of troubles’ (2015: 26), the 1990s were also characterized by 
high hopes and a rather positive view of the EU in Moscow. This was in 
sharp contrast to the negative Russian view of NATO in the same period 
(Bordachev 2009: 56–57). 
After 2000s: The Putin eras 
A certain degree of optimism. Putin’s first years as president were char-
acterized by high hopes for the relationship on both sides. Russia 
viewed the development of ties with the EU, in particular regarding 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as ‘a means to counter-
balance “NATO-centrism” in Europe’ (Lynch 2004: 108). Some EU 
member states, such as France, keen to create a European defence more 
independent of the USA, supported this view. Still, most member states 
saw the development of an ESDP as a way of strengthening the Europe-
an dimension within a still US-led NATO. The contrasting visions re-
mained.  
Another important example of the contrasting perceptions of the in-
teraction is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), presented by 
the EU in March 2003. While the EU invited Russia to take part, and 
has tended to see this as an example of their persistent readiness to 
include Russia, things looked very different as seen from Moscow. Ac-
cording to leading Russian expert Nadezhda Arbatova, the EU formu-
lated an invitation it should have known that Moscow was bound to 
turn down, so Brussels thereby got ‘an argument against including 
Russia in its regional strategies on the alleged grounds that “Russia 
Beyond the crisis in Ukraine 13 
does not want to” take part’ (Arbatova 2014: 12). Initially, Russia was 
not seriously concerned about the ENP (Gretskiy, Treshchenkov and 
Golubev 2014; Haukkala 2015). However, it was rather annoyed by the 
EU's attempt to define the countries bordering on the EU as Europe's 
neighbours, thus equating the EU and Europe as such. EU–Russia rela-
tions were instead meant to be dealt with through the creation of the 
four Common Spaces at the St. Petersburg EU–Russia Summit in May 
2003. These spaces, situated within the framework of the PCA, were to 
be based on ‘common values and shared interests’ (European Commis-
sion 2004). 
Although Russia and the USA were at odds about the 2003 Iraq war, 
the US invasion also brought Moscow, Berlin and Paris closer together 
in joint opposition to the war. Thus, at this point relations with the EU 
were still rather good. In May 2005 Russia and the EU also agreed on 
road maps that identified how these common spaces were to be put into 
effect.5 
Growing disappointment. After this first period of limited optimism, 
Brussels observed that Putin was gradually becoming more critical of 
the EU and the values it promoted, and less willing to cooperate con-
structively.  Moscow was alarmed by the ‘colour revolutions’ in Russia’s 
and the EU’s neighbourhood, in particular in Ukraine in 2004, and the 
role seen to be played by the West. As in a mirror, the EU was alarmed 
by Russia’s reactions to the same events, and also by domestic devel-
opments in Russia (including the government takeover of main TV 
channels and the arrest of YUKOS owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky).  
In parallel to this, the EU continued its process of security communi-
ty building. The 2004 enlargement, which included many of the former 
Warsaw Pact members, combined with the establishment of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy, was seen as an important achievement for 
democracy-building and thereby also peacebuilding in Europe. But, in 
consequence, EU–Russia relations gradually became more tense. Con-
crete evidence of a more difficult relationship was the fact that the PCA 
was not replaced after its expiry in December 2007, and that the initia-
tive for Russian visa-free access to the EU never materialized.  
Then came the Russo–Georgian War in August 2008. Both Russia 
and the EU recognized the war as a clear sign that the relationship was 
in trouble – but in different ways. The EU and the West as such saw the 
it as a dangerous deviation from the established norms of international 
behaviour (although unnecessarily provoked by Georgia's President 
Saakashvili). Russia saw this war as a dangerous example of the perils 
of Western expansion that failed to take account of Russian perspec-
tives – and thus also as a warning to the West (Godzimirski, 2015). 
                                                          
5  http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/about/index_en.htm 
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If the EU was disappointed, the disappointment on the Russian side 
was no less significant. An instructive case was the interaction between 
the EU and Russia – and their respective visions of European security – 
following President Medvedev’s European Security Treaty initiative in 
2009.  In the Russian view, such a treaty was intended to ‘replace Eu-
rope's NATO-dominated security architecture with one that was more 
inclusive’ (Weitz 2012: 1). In the West, Medvedev's initiative has been 
criticized for lack of substance and for adding nothing new to already 
existing treaties (Lo 2009). There was also deeper resistance to 
Medvedev's initiative in the West. First, Western leaders saw no need to 
build a new security architecture, because they viewed the gradual 
expansion of Wider Europe as a success (Sakwa 2015: 29). Second, 
there was deep scepticism as to Moscow's motives. In Moscow, the 
Western lack of interest was interpreted as yet another demonstration 
that the West was not interested in an inclusive security architecture, 
but rather in expanding the very spheres of influence it claimed no 
longer had a role in today's world (Karaganov 2014; Ivanov 2015). 
Indeed, it was clear that the relationship suffered from a deep lack 
of understanding. The differing perceptions of the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP), created in 2009, are instructive. The EU saw the EaP as a natural 
next step in the framework of its neighbourhood policy, and an im-
portant instrument for achieving the long-term goal of security com-
munity building beyond EU borders through integration and interde-
pendence. Surprisingly to many in the EU, the EaP gave rise to serious 
concerns in Moscow, where it was largely seen as a geopolitical project 
with an anti-Russian rationale (Glazyev 2013; Yefremenko 2014; Arba-
tova 2014).  
The differences in this period can be summarized thus: While the EU 
consistently thought it was being inclusive, Russia consistently 
thought it was being excluded. A solid foundation had been laid for the 
confrontations to come. 
Towards confrontation. Since 2010, EU–Russia relations have been 
increasingly characterized by conflicts. While Russia’s joining the WTO 
in 2012 was viewed as an achievement, the EaP summit in Vilnius in 
December in 2013 represented a severe setback. 
A key point in the interaction between Russia and the EU was the 
Russia-led integration project among former Soviet republics, the Cus-
toms Union, which developed into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 
in 2015. In Sakwa’s (2015: 35) view, Russia’s drive towards Eurasian 
integration was spurred by the perceived failure of ‘Greater European 
integration’ and increasing frustration with the EU. In turn, Moscow’s 
initiative was viewed with unease in the West and thus ‘exacerbated 
the division of Europe’ (ibid.).  
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In this period, it became increasingly evident for the EU that Russia 
would not be incorporated into a European security community build-
ing with the EU at its core. All the same, the EU has not given up all 
hope of including the ‘common neighbourhood’ and promoting policy 
platforms for dialogue with Russia. The Partnership and Modernization 
platform (P4M) launched in 2010 was one such initiative, even though 
it has yielded limited results so far. Russia, on the other hand, wanted 
progress to be achieved in the relationship by solving several key is-
sues, including negotiations for a new cooperation agreement that was 
launched in 2008, visa-free regime, and disagreements concerning the 
EU’s third energy package. All these issues were soon to fade in the face 
of more dramatic developments. 
 3. The Ukraine crisis – a game-
changer? 
In this section, we take a closer look at key points of disagreement 
about the events that led up to the Ukraine crisis, as well as the reac-
tions. While these disagreements must be seen in relation to the differ-
ing worldviews outlined above, we also hold that the conflict has chal-
lenged these worldviews, ultimately leading to certain changes or ad-
aptation, particularly in the EU's approach – an important point to 
which we will return.  
Unsurprisingly, the causes of the conflict are presented very differ-
ently in the EU and in Russia. To the former, in line with the idea of a 
wider Europe and security community building, the main causes of the 
conflict are Russian aggression and lack of respect for Ukrainians sov-
ereignty as well as for international law.6 Russia, by contrast, considers 
the crisis to have been provoked by the Western-created ‘misbalance in 
international relations’ that has emerged since the end of the Cold War 
(Putin 2014g), and the West’s seeming inability to recognize that it is 
erecting new division lines in Europe.7 These differing views have also 
had support in academic circles. An instructive example is the debate 
between John Mearsheimer on the one hand and Michael McFaul and 
Stephen Sestanovich on the other, in Foreign Affairs in 2014 
(Mearsheimer 2014; McFaul et al. 2014). 
We now turn to EU and Russian views on the interference in Ukraine 
and the Association Agreement that detonated the crisis, on the annex-
ation of Crimea, and on the sanctions and counter-sanctions. 
3.1 Differing views on interference and agency 
In the view of the EU, and most of its member states, the Ukraine con-
flict started in earnest during the period leading up to the EaP summit 
in Vilnius when Russia put pressure on Yanukovich to make him reject 
or postpone Ukraine’s negotiated AA with the EU. Regarding the popu-
lar protests against the decision made by Yanukovich, the EU ‘took 
note of the unprecedented public support in Ukraine for political asso-
ciation and economic integration with the EU’ (EEAS 2015). Moreover, 
the subsequent political crisis in Ukraine, and the ensuing Russian 
military involvement, is seen by the EU as illegal Russian interference 
                                                          
6  Interviews, Brussels, May 2015. 
7  Interviews, Moscow, May 2015. 
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in the right of a sovereign country to determine its foreign policy orien-
tation and association.8 
When it comes to Moscow's view, there is a certain paradox in per-
ceptions of the role of the EU in the Ukraine crisis. On the one hand, the 
EU's engagement with Ukraine is seen a key catalyst for the crisis. On 
the other hand, there is the widespread opinion that the EU has become 
an actor of little – and decreasing – importance. The short answer to 
this seeming contradiction is that the EU is increasingly seen as the 
‘civilian wing’ of a US-led security community – and that the EU itself is 
weak and ridden with internal political and economic problems. That 
the EU seemed to disappear from the stage when events in Ukraine es-
calated helped to confirm the long-held scepticism against the EU. Rus-
sia sees the Ukraine crisis as a systemic crisis, a crisis caused by a sys-
tem where the USA is the dominant actor. 
Embedded in this larger story, Moscow's view is that the EU forced 
Ukraine to make an impossible choice: either Europe, or Russia (Ivanov 
2015). As seen from the Kremlin, Yanukovich, the lawfully elected 
president of Ukraine, had made some sober calculations about the best 
interests of his country when he decided to postpone the possible sign-
ing of the Association Agreement with the EU. It was thus the Western 
countries that openly interfered in Ukraine's affairs when they came 
out in support of the Maidan protesters in Kyiv. And similarly when 
Western countries immediately welcomed the takeover of power in Kyiv 
(what Moscow has called a coup), when Yanukovich fled the country. 
In Russia, the West is accused of ignoring the internal complexity of 
Ukrainian affairs. Russia sees Ukraine as a divided country in terms of 
geopolitical orientation, where parts of the population seek closer ties 
to Russia, whereas other parts favour the West. The EU is seen as hav-
ing ‘sleepwalked’ into a crisis it did not want and for which it was not 
prepared.9 At the same time the EU is not considered to be an inde-
pendent ‘player’: the USA is seen as the leading actor.  
Whereas the EU views the Maidan protests as the legitimate expres-
sion of the will of the Ukrainian people, Russia does not recognize the 
Maidan protesters' agency or ‘actorness’. In the Russian view, the sub-
sequent events cannot be explained by dissatisfaction on the part of the 
population or Yanukovych's incompetent rule: it was the people's an-
ger, and the fact that their frustration with a corrupt and dysfunctional 
government was exploited by external actors.10 
                                                          
 8  Interviews, Brussels, May 2015. 
 9  Interview with S. Karaganov, Moscow, May 2015. 
10  The main culprit is the USA, with the EU and European countries as ‘satellites’, i.e. 
not independent actors. The USA is blamed for planning and supporting the ‘coup’, 
and for giving carte blanche to the new Kiev government (interviews , Moscow, May 
2015). 
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3.2  Different interpretations of the AA agreement 
Nonetheless, what detonated the crisis were Ukraine's negotiations for 
an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU. The conflicts surrounding 
the AA that the EU had negotiated with Ukraine, and which was in-
tended to be signed at the EaP Vilnius summit in November 2013, epit-
omize the differences between the EU and Russia. 
In the EU view, Ukraine could not be part of both the Deep Compre-
hensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) and the Customs Union (CU; 
from 1 January 2015: the Eurasian Economic Union, EEU). The reason 
put forward for this is that CU members apply the same tariffs on im-
ports of goods from the outside world and delegate their tariff-
negotiating authority to the CU authority. In contrast, ‘straightforward’ 
free trade agreements (FTAs) allow member countries to make ar-
rangements with third countries as they see fit, provided basic World 
Trade Organization guidelines are respected. This means that if Ukraine 
were to join the CU/EEU, it would have to renounce its free trade ar-
rangement with the EU. Alternatively, the EU’s free trade arrangement 
with Ukraine would need to be transformed into an FTA with the 
CU/EEU, which appeared highly unlikely – at least at that time.11 
The former European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neigh-
bourhood explained this incompatibility as follows a few months be-
fore the Vilnius summit: 
This is not because of ideological differences; this is not about a clash of economic 
blocs, or a zero-sum game. This is due to legal impossibilities: for instance, you 
cannot at the same time lower your customs tariffs as per the DCFTA and increase 
them as a result of the Customs Union membership […] Let me emphasise that 
AA/DCFTAs are not conceived at Russia's expense. On the contrary, Russia will also 
benefit greatly from the integration of the Eastern Partnership countries into the 
wider European economy. Our vision is that these agreements should contribute in 
the long term to the eventual creation of a common economic space from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok, based on WTO rules (Füle 2013). 
In the Russian view, however, implementation of the Association 
Agreement between Ukraine and the EU would carry significant risks 
for the Russian economy. Ukraine and Russia have extensive trade rela-
tions. Until recently, Russia accounted for a third of Ukrainian imports 
and a quarter of its exports. While Ukraine accounted only for about 
5% of Russia’s trade, it was still its biggest trading partner in the former 
USSR area (Borderlex 2014). Part of the reason why the possibility of 
Ukraine entering DCFTA with the EU was seen as such a crucial issue is 
because of the lack of correspondence between technical standards 
in Russia and in Europe. Russia feared that introducing EU regulations 
in Ukraine would make it impossible for Russia to sell its own machine-
building products or any other industrial goods to Ukraine. As a coun-
                                                          
11  Interviews, Brussels, May 2015. 
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ter-measure, Moscow warned that if that should happen, Russia could 
not accept Ukrainian agricultural production goods because of differ-
ent phytosanitary standards in Russia and in the EU. Putin declared 
(2014f): ‘if we do not achieve any agreements and our concerns are not 
taken into account, then we will be forced to take measures to protect 
our economy.’  
However, analysts have questioned the validity of the supposed in-
compatibility, as well as the idea of a zero-sum game between incom-
patible trade blocs (Krist and Benka 2014; Charap and Troitsky 2013). 
For instance, Charap and Troitsky argue that that there was nothing 
about the DCFTA and the Customs Union as such that made them in-
herently incompatible, as both are based on WTO regulations. While 
differing tariff levels are problematic, this would merely be a challenge 
for policy-makers (Charap and Troitsky 2013: 58–59) – a challenge of 
the kind political leaders are expected to be able to solve. In a docu-
ment published by the European Commission in January 2014, titled 
‘Myths about the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement. Setting the facts 
straight’, the EU also made an attempt to counter the arguments from 
Moscow (European Commission 2014a).  
Most attention with regard to the AA has been paid to matters of 
economy and trade. However, Russia also emphasizes convergence in 
the area of foreign and security policy since  the AA is much more than 
a trade agreement, and even includes an article stating the parties shall 
‘promote their gradual convergence in the area of foreign and security 
policy, including Common Security and Defence Policy’ (Official Jour-
nal of the EU 2014: article 7). While this is particularly provocative for 
Russia (Sakwa 2015), the EU dismisses it as a minor issue, since it only 
opens up for a potential contribution from Ukraine to EU’s crisis man-
agement operations in third countries. In many ways this is standard 
procedure in EU relations with partner countries. 
3.3  Different perspectives on the Crimea crisis 
While the different views concerning the implications of the AA are 
important for understanding the start of the conflict, the Russian an-
nexation of Crimea moved the conflict to a new level. For the EU (and 
the West as such), the Crimea question was straightforward: this was 
an unlawful annexation, indeed the first of its kind in Europe since the 
Second World War, and one that took place at a time when Ukraine was 
ready to look forward to a more democratic post-Yanukovich era. The 
annexation can in no way be justified; Russian ‘actions are in clear 
breach of the UN Charter and the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, as well as of 
Russia’s specific commitments to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the 
bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 1997’ 
(Foreign Affairs Council of the EU 2014a: article 1). In many ways, the 
Crimea annexation contradicted everything the EU represented. 
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In Russia, the ‘reunification’ with Crimea was presented in a context 
of Western betrayal, by referring to the failure to uphold the 21 Febru-
ary agreement between Yanukovich and the opposition that had stipu-
lated early elections within the year. This was combined with a per-
ceived threat from the new (and, to the Kremlin, not legitimate) gov-
ernment in Kyiv to reduce the status of the Russian language, although 
the provision was never signed into law. Insisting that the Crimea ref-
erendum had proceeded in ‘full compliance with democratic proce-
dures and international norms’, Putin made accusations of Western 
double standards a main theme (thereby making the question of the 
referendum's legitimacy secondary): ‘They say we are violating norms 
of international law. Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least remem-
ber that there exists such a thing as international law – better late than 
never’ (Putin 2014b). Russia has repeatedly accused the West of ‘nam-
ing the same phenomenon first white, then black’ (Putin 2015) – pro-
testers in Kyiv were hailed as democratic representatives of the people, 
while protesters in the East were seen as terrorists. In Russia, the Cri-
mea annexation was, among other justifications, presented as a logical 
response to the EU’s security community building process and the 
promotion of ideas of a ‘Wider Europe’. 
In its reactions to Russia’s actions in Crimea, the EU discourse also 
changed from focusing on various ways of including Russia in an EU-
centred security community – the main theme up until then – to a dis-
course of threat. As emphasized in the conclusions from the March 
2014 meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council: 
In the absence of de-escalating steps by Russia, the EU shall decide about conse-
quences for bilateral relations between the EU and Russia, for instance suspending 
bilateral talks with Russia on visa matters as well as a New Agreement, and will 
consider further targeted measures (Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union 
2014a: article 4). 
This is upheld in the Council Conclusions in April, where the Council 
‘demands Russia to call back its troops from the Ukrainian border and 
immediately withdraw the mandate of the Federation Council to use 
force on Ukrainian soil’ (Foreign Affairs Council of the EU 2014b). The 
Council further ‘reiterates its strong condemnation of the illegal annex-
ation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and will not 
recognise it’ (ibid.). While, condemnation of Russian actions is domi-
nant in EU statements, the Council meeting in April 2014 also  
reiterates the importance of Russia’s and Ukraine’ engagement in a meaningful dia-
logue, including through the establishment of a multilateral mechanism, with a 
view to find a political solution, based on full respect of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity [and that the] European Union is ready to participate in such an 
international mechanism (ibid, italics added). 
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Still, at this point there were no signs of significant changes in the EU’s 
approach. Rather it ‘reiterate[d] the EU’s commitment to sign the re-
maining provisions of the Association Agreement, including the Deep 
and Comprehensive free Trade Area as soon as possible after the presi-
dential election on 25 of May’ (Foreign Affairs Council of the EU 2014b) 
and reaffirmed its support for political association and economic inte-
gration with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, emphasizing that it 
was looking forward to early signature of AAs, including DCFTAs, no 
later than June 2014 (ibid.). As the same Council conclusions declare 
that ‘the European Union is confident that further deepening of EU–
Georgia and EU–Republic of Moldova will have a positive impact on 
stability and socio-economic development, for the benefit of all citizens 
of the two countries’ (ibid.), it is clear that the EU was still a confident 
believer in the value of its approach, and still considered the expansion 
of its security community building logic to be appropriate policy. 
3.4  The reactions: sanctions and counter-sanctions 
The EU’s unanimous decision to implement sanctions against Russian 
came as a surprise to many, Russia not least.12 Few in Moscow ex-
pected that the EU would exhibit such unity, in particular against the 
interests of the business community.13 Already on 17 March 2014, the 
first sanctions or restrictive measures by the EU were introduced: travel 
bans and asset freezes against Russian and Ukrainian officials follow-
ing Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. Also when these sanctions 
against Russia were reinforced in July 2014, the President of the Euro-
pean Council at that time, van Rompuy,  and the President of the Euro-
pean Commission, Barroso, argued in a common statement that the EU 
had, since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, ‘been calling on the 
Russian leadership to work towards a peaceful resolution […] We regret 
to say that despite some mixed messages coming from Moscow, and 
exchanges in the Normandy and other formats, there has been scarce 
delivery on commitments’ (European Commission 2014b). 
In addition to this critical discourse, the EU also opened up for dia-
logue, arguing that ‘the Russian Federation and the European Union 
have important common interests. We will both benefit from an open 
and frank dialogue […] But we cannot pursue this important positive 
agenda when Crimea is illegally annexed, when Russian Federation 
supports armed revolt in Eastern Ukraine […]’ (European Commission 
2014b).  
                                                          
12  For an overview of EU sanctions, see 
http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-
coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm. For an overview of US sanctions, see 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/ 
13  Interviews, Moscow, May 2015. 
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The EU has not seen the desired changes from Russia; instead they 
have observed further Russian involvement in the conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine. The economic sanctions against Russia continue to be upheld, 
and have been extended several times. In June 2015, the European 
Council extended the EU restrictive measures until 23 June 2016; and 
in September, decided to prolong by 6 months (until 15 March 2016) 
the asset freeze and travel bans against 149 Russian individuals and 37 
Russian entities (ref). 14 
In its reactions to the sanctions, the Russian authorities have ques-
tioned Western motivations. They have insisted that the sanctions are 
fully unfounded, and – importantly in our context – have interpreted 
the sanctions as revealing the West's unwillingness to engage in dia-
logue. Russia has also indicated the sanctions may contravene WTO 
rules. Putin has underlined that sanctions will not lead to the intended 
results: rather, in today’s interconnected world, sanctions will be mu-
tually harmful (Putin 2014a, 2014c). When more sanctions were im-
plemented, Putin admitted that they might hurt the economy some-
what, although in a ‘not critical way’, while also insisting that there 
were potential positive effects for the Russian economy.15 An oft-
repeated point was that sanctions have revealed that companies like 
VISA and MasterCard easily give in to political pressure, so Russia 
should establish its own national payment system (see Putin 2014d): 
that is, the sanctions were interpreted as showing that more national 
control was necessary in Russia. 
As Western sanctions were not lifted, but on the contrary continued 
to be introduced, notably after passenger flight MH17 was shot down in 
July 2014, Russia introduced its own ‘counter-sanctions’ on 6 August. 
This included a ban on the import of food produce from most of the 
countries that, as Putin put it, had imposed ‘entirely unfounded and 
unlawful sanctions’ on Russia (Putin 2014e). He claimed that these 
measures were not retaliatory, but first and foremost intended to sup-
port Russian manufacturers in these new conditions, as well 
as opening Russian markets to nations and manufacturers wishing 
to cooperate with Russia. 
  
                                                          
14  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/ 
15  The sanctions do hurt the Russian economy. For an early discussion that distin-
guishes between the ‘impact’ and the ‘effectiveness’ of the sanctions – that is, be-
tween the damage the sanctions can inflict on the Russian economy and the likeli-
ness of the sanctions leading to foreign policy changes – see Gaddy and Ickes 
2014. See also Oxienstierna and Olsson 2015. 
 4. Towards greater dialogue and 
pragmatism? 
Throughout the crisis, both the EU and Russia seem to have expected 
the other side to admit the fundamental misguidedness of its earlier 
ways. They have certainly waited for the other side to adjust its ap-
proach towards Ukraine. While the essence of the conflict remains, and 
the EU has not lifted any sanctions or made any concessions concern-
ing Crimea, Brussels has also gradually showed a somewhat greater 
willingness to accommodate Russia – or at least enter into some sort of 
dialogue with Moscow.  
Let us briefly note three instances of interaction between the EU (or 
its member states) with Russia. First, there are the Normandy consulta-
tions, intended to facilitate a solution to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 
The EU as such does not participate in these consultations, but is repre-
sented by France and Germany, who make up the ‘Normandy Four’ 
together with Ukraine and Russia. Second, there are the regular consul-
tations between Russia, Ukraine and the EU on implementation of the 
AA, including the DCFTA. In the beginning, the EU refused to consult 
Russia in these matters, seeing them as a bilateral concern involving 
the EU and Ukraine. However, in view of the circumstances, the EU has 
adjusted its original position and included Russia in ‘trilateral talks’.16 
These talks have also resulted in postponing the provisional applica-
tion of the DCFTA until 1 January 2016. Finally, although this remains 
contested internally in the EU, there are signs that the European Com-
mission also will try to engage in some form of bilateral dialogue with 
the Eurasian Economic Union once a ceasefire can be fully implement-
ed in Ukraine (Euractive 2015a). To what extent do these attempts at 
dialogue represent a shift in relations between Russia and the EU?  
4.1 The Normandy dialogue  
While the trilateral dialogue and the potential dialogue between EU 
and EEC both include/will include the EU as one of the partners, in the 
Normandy format the EU as such is not a partner: Germany and France 
together with Ukraine and Russia attempt to facilitate a solution to the 
crisis.17 The Normandy format fits with Russia’s preference for dealing 
                                                          
16  Similar talks have also been undertaken in relations to gas issues, but these talks 
will not be covered here. 
17  The Normandy format should not be confused with the ‘trilateral contact group on 
Ukraine’, composed of representatives from Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE and es-
tablished on the initiative of the newly elected president of Ukraine, Petro Po-
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with the main European countries rather than with the EU. In Moscow, 
the EU is seen as having disappeared from the scene after February 
2014, revealing its lack of common foreign policy clout. The Ger-
man/French initiative has been interpreted as confirmation that the 
main European countries rather than the EU are the appropriate inter-
locutors.18 
The presidents of the ‘Normandy Four’ have met on several occa-
sions in the course of 2014 and 2015. In addition, they have had tele-
phone conferences, and the foreign ministers of the four countries have 
met on various occasions. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the talks 
have been conducted behind closed doors.  
After the first ceasefire agreement (Minsk 1, from September 2014) 
was violated, the heads of state of the Normandy format countries were 
instrumental in facilitating the ‘Minsk 2’agreement of 11–12 February 
2015, which so far – numerous violations notwithstanding – has 
proved more sustainable. The two Minsk agreements (September 2014 
and February 2015) were signed by Russia and Ukraine, as well as rep-
resentatives of the ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Donetsk Peo-
ple’s Republic.’  
While all sides repeatedly stress the need for a diplomatic solution 
and that the Minsk 2 agreement is the only way forward, the limitations 
of the agreement were apparent from the start (le Gloannec 2015; Tren-
in 2015). The well-known Russian analyst Dimitri Trenin has summa-
rized the different sides’ motivation as follows: 
The new Minsk agreement is mainly a product of Europe’s fear of war and Ukraine’s 
rapidly deteriorating military, economic and political condition. The Germans and 
the French were jolted into action by the prospect of the United States arming Kyiv, 
provoking Moscow to rise to a new level of confrontation. Ukraine’s leadership had 
to choose between the Scylla of making a bad peace and the Charybdis of continu-
ing a losing war. As for the Russians, freezing the conflict along the lines of en-
gagement and making the ‘people’s republics’ safe from enemy fire was the best op-
tion available (Trenin 2015). 
He concluded that, because of the fundamental differences between 
the parties, ‘[t]he Minsk truce will not end confrontation, but rather 
recognize it. It will not necessarily prevent further escalation, but might 
postpone it’ (Trenin 2015).  
In a joint press conference with Angela Merkel held in October 
2015, Putin gave his assessment of the Normandy format: ‘[it] has 
shown itself to be quite an effective instrument for international facili-
                                                          
roshenko, in May 2014 as a means of facilitating a diplomatic solution to the war in 
the Donbass region of Ukraine.  
18  Interviews,, Moscow, May 2015. 
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tation of a peaceful settlement for the conflict in the Donbass region’. 
He also spoke of the process more broadly: 
Yes, it is true that we differ considerably in our assessment of the events that led to 
the anti-constitutional coup in the Ukrainian capital in February 2014. But at the 
same time, I am sure that you will all agree, and the participants in the peace talks 
say this constantly, that there is no alternative to a peaceful diplomatic solution. To 
achieve this, we must fully and strictly abide by the Minsk agreements reached on 
February 12 this year. I remind you that peace settlement measures form a package 
that ties together all of the key aspects for a settlement: political, military, socioec-
onomic and humanitarian (Putin 2015). 
On the other hand, the Kyiv government has been concerned with what 
it ‘sees as an unfair but persistent focus on “Ukraine’s obligations”’, 
that Donbass will remain outside of central control, and that the sanc-
tions on Russia may be lifted too soon (see Wilson 2015). Lilia Shev-
tsova, a prominent scholar and critic of Putin, has even held that the 
Minsk Agreements are such that ‘the Kremlin, in short, won’ (Shevtsova 
2015). 
When the Normandy Four met again in September 2015 (represent-
ed by the foreign ministers of the four countries) to assess the current 
state of the agreement, the ministers hailed the recent near-cessation of 
hostilities as a ground-breaking first step in the construction of a new 
sustainable relationship between the Kyiv government and the two 
eastern regions which are still reluctant to recognize it.  However, they 
also agreed that it was time for the central government and representa-
tives of the two regions to begin direct negotiations to reach agreement 
on a path for peaceful resolution of the sharp differences which still 
haunt efforts for peace (Ratcliff 2015).  
It has also been argued that progress in implementing Minsk 2 has 
been possible because the Western powers have agreed to put pressure 
on Kyiv to pass legislation that would provide greater autonomy to the 
regions, and to pull back major weapons from the frontlines in the Do-
netsk region; further, that Russia has insisted that the separatist gov-
ernments withdraw weapons and accept the Kyiv legislation as a step 
toward implementation of the agreement (Ratcliff 2015). It seems likely 
that the Minsk 2 ceasefire would not have held up as well as it has if 
Moscow had not wanted so, and the separatist movements in Donbass 
appear to have changed their ambitions significantly (see e.g. 
Nechepurenko 2015). For example, in October 2015 the separatist 
leaders planned to hold local elections, in contravention of the Minsk 2 
agreement – which might have threatened the whole process. After 
discussions in the Normandy format, Putin reportedly stepped in and 
persuaded the separatist leaders to abandon their plans (Sukhov 
2015). 
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At any rate, events indicate that Russia is interested in a negotiated 
settlement. Even if main views on the crisis and European security may 
not have changed, Moscow seems to have recognized the dangers of 
further escalation (see e.g.  Pynnöniemi 2014). One problem is that, as 
we have seen, the differences between the parties remain such that it is 
not easy to reach a sustainable compromise. Russia's objectives do not 
correspond to the wishes of the government in Kyiv. Key elements here 
include devolution of power to the eastern regions in Ukraine, keeping 
Ukraine outside of NATO, and recognition on behalf of the EU that its 
policies in regard to the ’neighbourhood’ need to be revised. 
4.2 The trilateral dialogue on DCFTA  
The DCFTA is a highly technical issue. In the context of EU–Russian 
relations, it is also a highly politicized one – and a fruitful prism for 
examining the developing interplay between the two sides. From the 
beginning, the EU insisted on the incompatibility of the DCFTA and the 
CIS free trade area. Although that is still the case, the EU has opened up 
for trilateral talks between the EU, Russia and Ukraine in order to deal 
with concerns about the impact of the DCFTA on the Russian economy. 
The consultation process at ministerial level was launched on 11 July 
2014. As of December 2015 thirteen trilateral meetings, including four 
at ministerial level, have been held to search for practical solutions to 
concerns raised by the Russian Federation regarding implementation of 
the DCFTA between Ukraine and the EU. According to the Commission 
‘the ministerial level meetings have provided detailed guidance to the 
work of experts on the areas related to the implementation of the 
DCFTA’ (European Commission 2015).   
The Kremlin, which has consistently held that a key reason for the 
whole crisis is the EU’s unwillingness to engage in consultations with 
Russian and Ukraine on how to mitigate the consequences of the AA for 
Ukraine’s obligations as a member of the CIS free trade area, has wel-
comed the EU willingness to discuss the DCFTA in a trilateral manner – 
stating that it is ‘better late than never’ (see below). At the same time, 
Russia has voiced concern as to how serious the EU is about these con-
sultations. Moscow has also expressed clear suspicions as to why the 
EU was not interested in any such discussions previously: 
The EU’s Eastern Partnership Programme was also aimed at eastward expansion of 
the geopolitical area subjugated to the West. Probably, precisely because that was 
the true reason for this project, the promises of trilateral talks… never materialised. 
They attempted to place the CIS countries in front of a harsh and absolutely invent-
ed and artificial choice – either with the EU or with Russia. (Lavrov 2014e) 
In his March 2014 Crimea speech, Putin stressed his resentment at how 
he perceived EU–Russian interaction leading up to the crisis: ‘They 
kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern you”’ 
(Putin 2014b).’ 
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Russia has remained sceptical about the depth of the EU’s willing-
ness to engage in genuine discussions. Still, during 2014–2015 Rus-
sian officials have emphasized that the EU nonetheless is ‘learning’. 
For example, in May 2015 Foreign Minister Lavrov commented on the 
trilateral consultations between Russia, Ukraine and the EU about the 
consequences of the AA for Russia and Russia–Ukraine ties: 
It’s better late than never. This is a correct and useful step. Had the European Com-
mission adopted this approach in October or November 2013, then perhaps there 
would have been no Maidan or bloodshed in southeastern Ukraine or the destruc-
tion of social and civilian infrastructure. In other words, now we are back at the 
point where we were a year and a half ago, when we proposed these tripartite con-
sultations, but at that time Brussels categorically rejected them. Today, we are back 
in the same situation, and our proposal is no longer considered unacceptable, but 
the difference between the two situations is thousands of people killed, tens of 
thousands injured, and destruction in southeastern Ukraine (Lavrov 2014d). 
According to the EU, the true impact on Ukrainian–Russian trade as 
regards the whole standards issue is hard to establish. Russia has been 
modernizing its technical standards, and about half of them are now 
similar to those applied in the EU. Moreover, product standards for 
military equipment – a mainstay of Russian–Ukraine industrial trade – 
are not covered by the EU–Ukraine DCFTA. At an earlier stage, the EU 
and Ukraine indicated that they were willing to consider longer phase-
in periods for Ukraine to adopt EU standards, and also consider an ar-
rangement whereby certain Russian product standards would be rec-
ognized as equivalent to the EU ones implemented by Ukraine 
(Borderlex 2014: 949). This means that a flexible arrangement could be 
foreseen – one that would allow Ukraine to maximize its trading rela-
tionships with both the EU and the EEU. As yet, the main result of these 
talks has been that implementation of the DCFTA has been postponed, 
to be provisionally implemented as of 1 January 2016.  
This decision has been controversial in the EU, as some see it as a 
result of the EU’s weakness and willingness to compromise on values 
by accommodating Russia (Speck 2015; Åslund 2015). However, it can 
also be viewed as a way of conducting pragmatic diplomacy. According 
to a statement from the European Commission, the results thus far do 
not imply a major change in the EU’s approach. In the view of the 
Commission, the results are purely clarifications of how to address 
some of the concerns expressed by Russia. Some of these will be ad-
dressed in the context of the existing flexibilities available in the 
DCFTA. Other concerns will be dealt with at a later stage in the context 
of bilateral or trilateral and pluri-lateral cooperation frameworks. More 
importantly, the Commission underscores that the all three participants 
agrees that any practical solutions will have to respect the relevant 
WTO provisions (European Commission 2015). 
Pernille Rieker and Kristian Lundby Gjerde 
 
28 
4.3 Towards dialogue between the EU and EEU? 
Russia has long desired institutionalized contacts between the EU and 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU, formerly the Customs Union). After 
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier supported the idea, 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that he welcomed increased 
European readiness to the idea of harmonizing integration processes 
on the European continent (Lavrov 2014c). 
In November 2015, the European Commission was again reported as 
supporting direct talks between the EU and the EEU, partly to counter-
balance the extension of sanctions and the planned introduction of the 
DCFTA with Ukraine from 1 January 2016 (RFE/RL 2015; Deutsche 
Welle 2015). The idea was put forward by European Commission Presi-
dent Jean-Claude Juncker, who wrote a letter to Russian President Vla-
dimir Putin in which he proposed closer trade ties between the EU and 
the Russian-led Eurasian Union if implementation of the Minsk agree-
ments proceeded as planned (Euractiv 2015b).  
While this is clearly an attempt to establish a better working rela-
tionship between the EU and Russia, the idea remains controversial 
with the EU, just as the trilateral talks do. Among the reasons are the 
fact that EEU members Belarus and Kazakhstan are not WTO members; 
doubts about potential results; and reluctance to appear to be ‘appeas-
ing’ Russia (see Moshes 2014; also RFE/RL 2015).  
This criticism notwithstanding, recent developments in these vari-
ous dialogue formats clearly indicate that the EU has begun to adopt a 
more pragmatic approach on Russia. Seen in addition to the recent re-
vision of the Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission/High Rep-
resentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015), 
this might indicate that the EU is gradually moving away from its strict-
ly normative-based approach, and that more weight is accorded to geo-
political considerations (Euractiv 2015b). 
 
 5. Potential implications for 
European security 
Given these factors, what kind of implications of the Ukraine crisis can 
we foresee for European security and stability? At first glance, it seems 
as if the differences between the EU’s security community logic (the 
‘Wider Europe’ perspective) and Russia’s balance-of-power emphasis 
(the ‘Greater Europe’ perspective), are so fundamental that it is difficult 
to imagine any solutions unless at least one of the parties makes seri-
ous adjustments – perhaps even compromising on its basic ideas or 
interests. And yet, it might be possible to find a new type of working 
relationship between the two. As noted above, there are certain 
tendencies towards a partial ‘rapprochement’ despite the profound 
differences between the two parties – not least, certain important ad-
justments in the EU’s approach.  
On the Russian side, key foreign policy decisions are increasingly 
taken within a very narrow circle around President Putin, and the main 
discourse is to a lesser extent challenged by influential actors domesti-
cally (at least in the open). Russian rhetoric has stressed that it is the 
EU that is adapting. Still, changes in Russian practices and discourse 
indicate willingness to find a compromise. These include Russia’s role 
in upholding the Minsk Agreement as well as the role played in the 
ongoing dialogue formats. President Putin's annual address in Decem-
ber 2015 did not include one word about the Ukraine conflict – but 
there was much about the terrorist threat, and about the economy. 
Moscow appears to be tired of the Ukraine crisis and the consequences 
for Russia. However, the extent of changes in the fundamentals of for-
eign policy thinking is an entirely different matter. 
Although the EU’s approach towards the ENP partner countries has 
been debated, the member states have, thus far, shown a high degree 
of unity, as shown by the unanimous decisions concerning the econom-
ic sanctions against Russia. Yet, perspectives can differ within the EU 
itself and among the member states – and these differences are increas-
ingly coming to the fore. We may broadly distinguish between two 
schools of thought as to how to deal with Russia. The first, until recent-
ly the dominant one, largely represented by the East European member 
states, argues for containment. These ‘normative hardliners’ have no 
wish to compromise on the EU’s integrative (or security community 
building) approach where Europeanization and socialization through 
mechanisms of conditionality are at the core. They think that there is 
not much to discuss with Putin; Russia is typically assigned all blame 
for the crisis. Members of this group do not want the EU’s policy to be 
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altered because of Russia, and they do not trust Russia’s ability to hon-
our any agreement.  
The second group, which now seems to be gaining increased sup-
port also in the EU as such, emphasizes the need to find a compromise 
solution. While not arguing, in line with Mearsheimer (2014), that 
Western policies were partly to blame for the crisis, an increasing num-
ber of member states – including France and Germany as well as Com-
mission President Juncker – have come out in favour of altering EU’s 
policy for the sake of European stability. Briefly put, they tend to seek 
ways of adapting the EU’s policy by increasingly taking into account 
the geopolitical realities and ‘the neighbour of the neighbours’: Russia. 
If this materializes, the EU will then depart from its long tradition of 
linking integration to security, at least in its relations with the post-
Soviet states. While the change might be less dramatic for the EU – the 
long-term goal of democracy promotion and promoting good govern-
ance in its neighbourhood is likely to be upheld and even be strength-
ened by other means – it is likely to be viewed by Kyiv as a ‘broken 
promise’. By the EU, this development will be justified in the name of 
ensuring European stability. 
We see examples of this change in the apparently increasing will-
ingness in Brussels to take part in dialogues of various formats, as well 
as acceptance of the need to find ways of accommodating Russia. With 
the joint communication on a revised European Neighbourhood Policy 
that was presented in November 2015 (European Commission/High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
2015), the EU has also indicated a move away from its external govern-
ance logic. Such a revised ENP seems to be less focused on partner-
country adaptation to the EU acquis, and more on various types of as-
sistance programmes that take into account the individual needs of the 
partner countries as they proceed towards democracy and good gov-
ernance. This means that the ENP will be changed into a specific for-
eign policy, rather than being part of an integration agenda.  
Undoubtedly, many in the West will be disheartened if, as a result of 
the Ukraine crisis, the EU changes its approach, and perhaps more sig-
nificantly so than Russia. Ever since the start of the crisis, both the EU 
and Russia have waited for the other side to ‘see the light’. The EU has 
waited for Russia to act in accordance with EU norms and expectations. 
Russia has waited for the EU to accept Moscow's view of European se-
curity. Neither has happened. But as the situation on the ground has 
developed, the EU has also acknowledged the need to take into account 
the consequences – actual and potential – of the actions of a disgrun-
tled Russia. 
In parallel, there are signs that Russia and France, but also the EU 
and the West as such, recognize the need for cooperation in the war 
against IS in Syria. Although such cooperation will be far from easy in 
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practice, these recent events further underscore the trend whereby the 
EU is emphasizing security and stability over traditional normative 
concerns.  
Does this mean that the EU is changing as a security actor? It is still 
too early to say, but recent changes indicates that the EU is downplay-
ing its attachment to the integration dynamic, while putting more em-
phasis on geopolitical realities. In this sense, the EU is gradually be-
coming a more strategic actor in its foreign policy. Spreading European 
core values will still be an ambition but a key lesson from the Ukraine 
crisis is that the EU’s traditional approach has not succeeded. A key 
question, of course, remains the true extent of such changes. So far, we 
see the contours of a more pragmatic EU policy towards Ukraine and 
other partner countries in the EU’s neighbourhood. One lesson learnt 
from the Ukraine crisis is that there may well be geographical limita-
tions to the traditional perspective of building a security community 
through the mechanisms of political and economic integration. 
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